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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CORPORATE
COLLECTIVE POWER TO NEW LABOUR'S
PROJECT: MARKET VALUES, CORPORATE
REGULATION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A
PROGRESSIVE POLITICS
Gary Wilson, School ofLaw, University ofKeele'
"The pure and sinless did not exist, or else died unnoticed and
with no obituary. The idea seemed persuasive. Those who
merited obituaries usually achieved things, fought for their
ideals, and when locked in battle, it wasn't easy to remain
entirely honest and upright. Today's battles were all for
material.gain, anyway. The crazy idealist was extinct- survived
by the crazy pragmatist . . . "
A. Kurkov, Death and the Penguin (2003) 61
Introduction
This paper seeks to sketch the historical development of the political
economy of the corporation in the United Kingdom from the onset of
modernity to the beginning of the twenty-first century, in order to
contextualise the significance of corporate power to the politics of New
Labour and to the broad possibilities offered by the major review of
company law legislation commenced in 1998.1 It will be argued that the way
in which the corporate entity is theorised and regulated is not simply a
subject for abstruse academic debate or for resolution at a technical level by
expert committee (though, for sure, both do have an important role) but is
rather a matter of central import to the broader trajectory of modem
industrial societies, both in terms of the appropriate regulation of collective
power and the generation of wider values beyond those of market
individualism. Accordingly, it thus posits a key issue for mainstream
progressive politics.
In order to substantiate this claim it will be necessary to interleave an
analysis of the pertinent constructs underpinning New Labour's political
programme (notably globalisation, post-Fordism, and the recent work of
Anthony Giddens! on the Third Way and progressive politics); the different
* The author would like to thank Michael Cardwell, Matthew Weait and Sarah
Wilson for their encouragement and comments. This article is written as at I
August 2005: the Company Law Reform Bill has subsequently been put before
Parliament.
I Following the publication of Modern Company Law for a Modern Economy: Final
Report (2001) by the Company Law Review Steering Group in June 2001, the
Government has issued two White Papers setting out proposals for consultation on
a new Companies Act: see Modernising Company Law (July 2002; Cm 5553) and
Company Law Reform (March 2005; Cm 6456).
2 The principal works are as follows: Beyond Left and Right: The Future ofRadical
Politics (1994); The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (1998); The
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approaches taken to the legal theorisation of the corporate entity; and the
present extensive corporate law reform programme in the United Kingdom.'
Particular emphasis will be given to attempting to capture the way in which
consideration of the collective power inherent in corporations would appear
to be notable largely by its absence in both corporate law theory and New
Labour's overall worldview. It will be suggested that the relative invisibility
of this collective power has potentially profound ramifications for the
possibilities inherent in a progressive politics (and thus for society as a
whole) given the juxtaposition of New Labour's well known desire to be
business friendly" and the increasing emphasis placed by New Labour
politicians upon the role of a distinctive set of values as the marker of a
progressive agenda. 5
The quote from Andrey Kurkov's Death and the Penguin at the head of this
article might indeed be thought to be prescient (the novel was first published
in 1996) when applied to the common critiques of New Labour's general
pro-business/pro-market philosophy and period in office, especially from
those on the traditional Left. At the same time it would not seem too far from
the mark to characterise the Labour Party's own trajectory over the last 25
years as shifting from 'crazy idealism' to 'crazy pragmatism'. The Party's
initial reaction to Thatcherism was to maintain a relatively ideologically pure
socialist position that placed the party in the political wilderness for over a
decade (the manifesto for the 1983 general election? was famously dubbed
'the longest suicide note in history'). As a direct response to this Blair's
internal party reforms of the mid-1990's7 led to the creation of New Labour
and the development of a rather murky set of social democratic principles
which, whilst leading to repeated electoral success (an unprecedented third
term was achieved in May 2005), sacrificed many fundamental Labour Party
Third Way and its Critics (2000); and Where Now for New Labour? (2002). Edited
collections comprise: The Global Third Way Debate (2001); The Progressive
Manifesto: New Ideas for the Centre-Left (2003); with W. Hutton, Global
Capitalism (2000); and with P. Diamond, The New Egalitarianism (2005).
) Insolvency law has also been extensively reformed in line with the New Labour
emphasis on fostering entrepreneurship through seeking to reduce the stigma of
failure in personal insolvency and to develop an enhanced rescue culture in
corporate insolvency: see Insolvency Act 2000, Enterprise Act 2002 and G. Wilson
and S. Wilson, 'Responsible Risk-Takers: Notions of Directorial Responsibility-
Past, Present and Future' (2001) 1 J Corp. Law Studies 211.
4 At each general election since' 1997 the party has produced a detailed separate
business manifesto. Blair's speech (28 April 2005) launching the 2005 business
manifesto was headed 'Labour is the Party of Business. '
5 See, e.g. T. Blair, 'Progressive Values', (Spring 2005) 4.1 Progressive Politics 57-
63. This journal is sponsored by Policy Network, an international independent
think tank for the development of progressive ideas of the centre-left chaired by
Peter Mandelson.
6 A New Hope for Britain: policies included Keynesian macro-economics, re-
nationalization of privatized industries and withdrawal from the European
Community.
7 It is important to note that Blair was able to build upon work undertaken by the two
previous Labour Party leaders, Neil Kinnock and John Smith, but the New Labour
soubriquet that has been used since shortly after Blair's election as leader in 1994
was clearly intended to signify a fundamental re-configuration of party policy.
494 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly [Vol. 56, No. 4]
precepts" in order, according to the modernisers, to regain relevance in the
profoundly changed circumstances of a globalized world; and according to
the critics, to facilitate the pragmatic pursuit of power.?
The burden of this article will be to argue that there is substance to the New
Labour programme (whether labelIed as the Third Way or reincarnated under
its current appellation progressive politics) but that to date the nature of
corporate collective power has been both inconsistently recognised and
inadequately theorised in this context. This has created a serious lacuna,
which is particularly important given the prominence of the business sector
in the present United Kingdom political firmament and the stress that is laid
upon values by those professing a progressive politics. As was noted by a
former Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers MP (when
promoting discussion about corporate governance as part of the independent
company law review process), the nature of the prospective reform of United
Kingdom corporate law is thus of crucial significance welI beyond the
narrow parameters ofcompany law itself:
"The reason this debate is important is that the way that
companies are allowed to operate defines the nature of the
market economy that we live in. The key to shaping the market
in ways that achieve our twin objectives of efficiency and
social justice lie in the framework of rules within which
companies do business and make a profit. So company law and
corporate governance are at the heart of the debate about the
kind of society we want and the nature of our economy.?"
It is interesting to note that, whilst Byers' initial sentence is addressing the
market economy, there is subsequently clear recognition of the pervasive
(indeed, to those of a critical disposition, corrosive) nature of the broad
highly individualist values and modus operandi originating in the market
domain with respect to society more generally." Given that New Labour's
preference for market solutions has also been vigorously extolled within the
sphere of the European Union, the United Kingdom is one of the key
sponsors of the Lisbon Agenda," it is not surprising that this issue has
8 Most notably, at least in symbolic tenus, by the repeal of Clause 4 of the Party's
constitution (re common ownership of the means of production via nationalization)
at the October 1994 party conference.
9 See T. Blair, The Third Way: New Politics/or a New Century (1998). Blair's frank
admission of the pragmatic nature of the project, 'what matters is what works to
give effect to our values' (ibid., pA) (together in later years with an undue reliance
on presentation or 'spin') has provided much grist to the critics' mill: see, e.g. the
articles in the special issue of Marxism Today (December 1998).
10 Speech made at the TUC / IPPR seminar on corporate governance (7 June 2000).
11 Byers' subsequent resignation as a Minister over the Railtrack administration in
May 2002 and recent admission (in an ultimately unsuccessful High Court action
brought against him for public misfeasance by aggrieved Railtrack shareholders)
that he told an untruth to Parliament, are in this light especially unfortunate from a
governance perspective. For a discussion of some of the issues involved, together
with an analysis the nature of Railtrack's successor company Network Rail, see L.
Whitehouse, 'Railtrack is Dead - Long Live Network Rail? Nationalization under
the Third Way' (2003) 30 J. a/Law & Sac 217.
12 The Agenda was adopted at the Lisbon European Council in 2000 with the
principal aim of making the European Union the most dynamic and competitive
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resonated badly with more social market orientated members of the Union,
whose outlook was concisely put by the former French Prime Minister, and
socialist, Lionel Jospin's remark, 'yes to a market economy, no to a market
society' .13 The article will conclude with an examination of the extent to
which the current corporate law reform proposals clearly address the
collective power of corporations and are thus congruent with the
development of a genuinely progressive politics as opposed to the adoption
of a defensive position essentially framed by neo-liberalism and resulting in
a society thoroughly infused by the values and culture of market
individualism.
The Rise and Demise of Collectivism
In order to progress it is first necessary to attempt to chart the import of the
notion of collective power, and corporate collective power in particular, as
these ideas are central to the issues this article seeks to explore. Further, as
power may for current purposes be said to be located in the temporal
relations to be found within the complex matrices of agents (consisting of
both institutional entities and individual persons) and structural conditions
that compose society, the overall dimensions of collective power will only be
rendered amenable to illumination, albeit feeble, through a broad
investigation of pertinent changes in society over time." Hence, it will be
argued that collective power is fully intelligible only in the context of the
particular stage of modernity under examination and that the ambit of such
power (and thus its precise significance) will be subject to modulation over
time as the rationalities of modernity play out and thereby re-shape its very
fabric.15 At a more concrete level the analysis will be pursued through the
ideas of combination and especially of collectivism (which became the
dominant mode of thinking in the latter part of the nineteenth century)." In
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and respect for the
environment.
13 See further, L. Jospin, Modern Socialism (1999). Like Blair, Jospin also places his
justification for social democracy upon values, but the emphasis is quite different
and is explicitly orientated around the regulation of the so-called 'natural'
capitalist model (ibid., p.l 0).
14 That such developments are believed to occur should not be taken as an
endorsement of a Whiggish or Hegelian approach to history as a progressive
unfolding of events.
15 There is not space here to pursue the thorny conceptual issues raised by the notion
of post-modernism: for a brief discussion see K. Kumar, From Post-Industrial to
Post-Modern Society (1995) 137-142, 173-183, and D. Harvey, The Condition of
Postmodernity (1990) chap.6. The stance that will be taken in this article is that the
current environment is one variously described as high modernity (Anthony
Giddens), reflexive or second modernity (Ulrich Beck), or liquid modernity
(Zygmunt Bauman); and which presents certain new conditions (which only
Bauman would be likely to describe formally as post-modern) of necessity
entailing a critical interrogation of its own rationalities.
16 Combination remained the dominant term in the United States but in the context of
corporate consolidations such as the Standard Oil Trust, industrial concentration in
the United Kingdom in general tended to occur significantly later: see
respectively, M. J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction ofAmerican Capitalism
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line with the broader argument herein it is no coincidence that both of these
concepts are more usually associated with the rise of organised labour for the
collective nature of corporate power was seemingly early suppressed by the
rise of a strong doctrine of separate corporate personality."
For the celebrated constitutional lawyer Albert Dicey the growth of
collectivism (admittedly largely focused around the recognition of trades
unions and the enactment of social legislation) was to provide the key to his
analysis of the relationship between the course of English thought and the
development of English law during the nineteenth century and early
twentieth centuries. IS However, despite the centrality of the concept of
collectivism to his deliberations Dicey was at pains to confess that a precise
definition of the term was not possible given its relative novelty and inherent
ambiguity. 19 Nevertheless, his stated preference was that collectivism
consisted of two moments: a negative rebuttal of laissez-faire individualism
as the basis for sound legislation and a positive endorsement of State
intervention in order to benefit the mass of the population, even if this
involved restrictions upon individual liberties." Unfortunately, from the
point of view of clarity, the second element is one that Dicey conflated with
socialism, even though he expressly rejected any application of the
concomitant economic precepts to his concept of collectivism, instead
reiterating his own compass for the term, whereby it was to be ' ... used as a
convenient antithesis to individualism in the field of legislation. '21
As Dicey himself acknowledged, the above definition was placed at an
unhelpfully high degree of abstraction and for the purposes of this essay
much may be gleaned from a close analysis of his application of the principle
to concrete legislative situations. It is at this level of exposition that power
relations are rendered discernible, though it should be borne in mind that
Dicey was not directing his thoughts towards making different sites of
collective power legible. Nevertheless, a rare explicit reference to collective
power is made where the powerlessness of an individual worker against a
corporation is advanced as part of the rationale for the emergent preference
for collective action in English society." Significantly, however, the
remainder of the discussion on this issue focuses around the legislative
J890- J916 (1988) and L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy (2nd ed.,
1983).
17 Until the mid-nineteenth century a companywas referred to in the plural reflecting
the combination of its shareholders but this linguistic practice changed to the
singular when shares became fully autonomous tradeable property. The adoption
of a robust legal concept of separate corporate personalityfrom the 1860's is thus
best seen as a reflection of this reification of the joint stock fund into money
capital, see P. Ireland, 'Capitalism Without the Capitalist: the Joint Stock
CompanyShare and the Emergence of the Modern Doctrineof SeparateCorporate
Personality' (1996) 17Journal oJLegal History 41.
IS A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law & Public Opinion in England
During the Nineteenth Century (2nd ed., 1962; first published 1905). Diceyset out
three broad periods of development: Old Toryism!Legislative Quiescence (1800-
1830); Benthamism! Individualism (1825-1870); and Collectivism (1865-1900).
19 ibid., p.64, n.I, and p.67.
20 ibid., p.259.
21 ibid., p.64, n.l.
22 ibid., p.266.
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mechanisms employed in the operationalization of the collective power of
workers through the legitimation of trades unions" and no further
consideration is given to the counterpoising power of the company.
This silence in relation to corporate collective power is despite the fact that
Dicey had earlier deliberated upon the characteristics of modem commerce
in the course of his discussion of the growth of collectivism." Although the
relevant section of the text is perhaps not as focused as now might be desired
in the light of modem developments in company law," Dicey's main
conclusion was that through legislative development, '. . . combination has
gradually become the soul of modem commercial systems'." Further, and in
accordance with his general typology of collectivism, this 'revolution' in
thought (to use Dicey's own term) had encouraged the State to interfere (on a
constant basis) with individuals' private property rights in furtherance of
business ends" and had also resulted in a tendency to celebrate the
advantages of collective action and thereby to diminish the importance of
individual endeavour." It would seem that Dicey (perhaps unwittingly) had
thus introduced another strand of meaning within his concept of collectivism
by which it refers to the agency and collective power of a corporate body as a
result of the combination of its shareholders and its legal and organisational
structure.29
23 Dicey believed that legislative impulses leading to the enactment of Combination
Acts in 1800, 1825 and 1875 exemplified his three stages of development. See
ibid., pp.271-73 and n.18 above.
24 ibid., pp.245-248.
25 It would be unfair to blame Dicey for his lack of clarity of exposition regarding
uses of the corporate form and the precise site of agency within a company as the
'one man' private company had only just been endorsed by the House of Lords in
Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22, and the relationship between the
shareholders and the board of directors over management matters was still the
subject of intense dispute until the decision, in the latter's favour, of the Court of
Appeal in Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906]
2 Ch. 34.
26 Principally the Limited Liability Act 1855 and Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 as
consolidated by the Companies Act 1862. For an extended discussion of
nineteenth century developments in company law from a doctrinal and a socio-
political view see respectively, B. C. Hunt, The Development of the Business
Corporation in England 1800-1867 (1936) and T. L. Alborn, Conceiving
Companies: Joint-stock Politics in Victorian England (1998).
27 Dicey contrasts a sole proprietor with a railway company having monopoly
privileges and requiring compulsory purchase rights. The special facets of the
latter are held to tie it closely to the state and to suggest public ownership. The
relation between the corporation and state was a matter of considerable
contemporary theoretical debate: see, e.g. F. Hallis, Corporate Personality (1930).
28 Dicey, op. cit., n.18, p.246, n.2 and p.247.
29 See n.25 above. The nature of combination is not explored but the rise of
managerialism due to the dispersed nature of personal shareholdings and the
subsequent shift from personal to impersonal shareholding resulting in, 'a
polyarchic structure ofhegemonic financial intermediaries which participate in the
controlling constellations of ... major enterprises' were well in the future: see
further, J. Scott, Corporations. Classes and Capitalism (2nd ed., 1985) (quotation
at p.259).
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History can make for surprising bedfellows and for Karl Marx, also
commentating on the growth of joint-stock companies in the mid-nineteenth
century (albeit from a very different political and theoretical perspective),
there was no doubt that capital possessed this element of social power.
Indeed, it was for this very reason that the joint-stock company represented
the very negation of the private entrepreneurial capitalist" and thereby
amounted to '[t]he abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the
capitalist mode of production itself, being in essence' ... private production
unchecked by private ownership.':"
Marx was, of course, discussing the role of credit and joint-stock companies
in the wider context of his analysis of society in the early stages of capitalist
development. According to Marxist theory the motor of capitalism lay in its
insatiable desire for accumulation through the medium of exchange on the
market and its fuel lay in the commodification of the labour relationship
between the owners and workers. The bourgeoisie were thus in a class war
with the proletariat and this antagonism was the hallmark of such a
thoroughgoing change in society that Marx and Engels discerned a
significant discontinuity with the past:
"Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted
disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and
agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-
formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that
is solid melts into air ... ,,32
Building upon this famous metaphor, Zygmunt Bauman has described the
development of this stage of modernity as one whereby, '[t]he melting of
solids lead to the progressive untying of economy from its traditional
political, ethical and cultural entanglements ... [and thereby] ... sedimented
a new order, defined primarily in economic terms. ,)) The foremost casualty
)0 A view shared by Joseph Schumpeter, though for reasons aligned with Dicey
rather than Marx, in that he believed that the modern corporation 'relentlessly
narrows the scope of capitalist motivation': 1. Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism
and Democracy (1994, first published 1943) 156.
n K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. III (1981) chap.27, and
p.569. This is not a proposition which would be recognised by economic liberals
for whom the recognition of shares as a form of private property has significant
governance implications: see, e.g. E. Sternberg, Corporate Governance:
Accountability in the Marketplace (2nd ed., 2004). However, this view of
shareholding would seem untenable, certainly in large publicly traded companies:
see further, P. Ireland, 'Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership'
(1999) 62 MLR. 32 and 1. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (1993)
32-41.
)2 K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (1998) 38. For an incisive
account of the relationship between this text and modernity see M. Berman, All
that is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience ofModernity (1983) Part 11.
n Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity (2000) 4 (hereafter 'Liquid Modernity'). The
following account draws heavily upon Bauman's analysis in this work (especially
the foreword and chapters 1, 2 and 4) and also upon the related essays in Z.
Bauman, The Individualized Society (2001). Many of the issues raised are the
The Significance of Corporate Collective Power to New. . . . 499
of this dissolution was the conception of being born into a place and status
which essentially determined an individual's subsequent life-course through
the interaction of a dense constellation of traditional cultural norms and
customary practices. The emergence of a capitalist order thus generated new
possibilities for individuals but the price was that it simultaneously, 'left the
whole complex network of social relations unstuck - bare, unprotected,
unarmed and exposed, impotent to resist the business-inspired rules of action
and business shaped criteria of rationality, let alone to compete with them
effectively. ,34 The economic logic of the process, however, initially resulted
in the evolution of a stabilisation mechanism by which the freedom imposed
upon individuals by the decline of tradition was directed through the
construction of distinct class and gender roles that managed expectations and
re-constrained action. In this manner these constructs provided a means by
which the old solids could be replaced by new solids which could reasonably
be expected to be durable in a world of radical and rapid transformation;
such new solids thereby constituting a regime (to use Bauman's phraseology)
of heavy capitalism or solid modernity. 3S
An undoubted iconic symbol of heavy capitalism is to be found in the mass
production system of the Fordist factory, as exemplified by Henry Ford's
plant at Highland Park in San Francisco." It embodies all the key features of
solid modernity, viz: the utilization of large centralized organizations
governed by instrumental rationality" and directed towards mass production
utilising economies of scale requiring considerable investment in heavy plant
with assembly lines populated by a whole host of labourers each undertaking
a discrete largely de-skilled operation in a production process orientated
around Taylorist principles." The primary emphasis is thus upon
permanence and structure and the result is a prison that neither capital nor
labour is able to leave."
subject of considerable contention and the principal areas of disputation will be
highlighted here or in the later discussion of post-Ford ism.
34 Liquid Modernity, pA.
35 Such change was very thorough-going; time itself was restructured to fit with the
regularities industrial production required, see E. P. Thompson, 'Time, Work-
Discipline and Industrial Capitalism' (1967) 38 Past and Present 56.
36 For introductions to Fordism see P. Brown and H. Lauder, Capitalism and Social
Progress (2001) chap. 3 and D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (1990)
chap. 8. The acme of this line of thinking may perhaps be found in J. K.
Galbraith's concept of the technostructure (with its intimate relationship to the
large corporation) in The New Industrial State (2nd ed., 1991).
37 Given the planning and co-ordination problems Fordism entailed it is unsurprising
that bureaucracy is strongly associated with it. For a nuanced defence of the 'ethos
of office' against both philosophical and managerialist critiques see P. Du Gay, In
Praise ofBureaucracy (2000).
38 F. W. Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management (1947, first published 1911).
Taylor's primary aim was to increase productivity by reducing 'soldiering'
(deliberate slacking); efficiency was maximized by detailed time and motion
studies which removed discretion from employees in the execution of their work.
Taylor himself maintained a rather utopian vision of his project as he believed the
resultant gains would be so plentiful as to ensure a co-operative approach within
the workplace and thus obviate the need for unions or collective bargaining: see
ibid., Testimony Before the Special House Committee in 1912.
39 Liquid Modernity, p.145.
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In this environment capital and workers were thus locked together in a
mutual interdependency based upon the economics of mass production,
whereby the concentration of capital within large corporations was to a large
extent mirrored by the agglomeration of workers needed to operate the plant.
Within this seemingly permanent framework of long-term relations it made
rational sense for the workers to act together so as to improve their common
future lot by combining so as to exercise a countervailing collective power to
that of capital." Further, the movement of people into cities to feed the
industrial maw created a problem of order and thus the state also became
increasingly enmeshed into the equation. In this light, the subsequent
adoption of Keynesian inspired economic policy and the construction of the
welfare state, as the principal elements of the post-war settlement, were by
no means coincidental as the state could use these stabilising capacities to
avoid or at least ameliorate the consequences of the periodic crises or
cyclical downturns in the economy. Hence, a protean and rather loose
corporatist approach emerged, albeit bounded within the clear parameters of
a national economy and society, as a means of seeking to encourage both
growth and stability."
However, as the aforementioned quote from The Communist Manifesto
clearly indicates, the dynamics of capitalism are relentless and despite the
formidable institutional edifices assembled it proved impossible to maintain
the Keynesian-Fordist regime. Instead, through the rise of an informational
society" and the concomitant processes of globalization national boundaries
have been rendered evermore permeable and collective ties have been
considerably weakened. In contrast to the regimented and predictable world
of heavy capitalism instantaneous information flows and borderless
competition have generated a paramount need for speed and flexibility: in
this world of short-term horizons modernity has been rendered liquid and
capitalism light.43
For Bauman there appear to be two central characteristics of light capitalism:
first, power is exercised foremost by mobility, and secondly, people are
subjected to radical 'individualization'. As the combination of these ideas
has profound consequences for the notion of collectivism here under
examination it is proposed to analyse them in some detail. By
'individualization' Bauman refers to the fact that individuals living under
present conditions have no given identities, (traditionally ascribed roles
having been stripped away in the acid bath of modernity) and are, therefore,
40 ibid., p.33.
41 Clearly the United Kingdom has never come close to developing a truly
corporatist system; the high-water mark was reached with the publication of the
ill-fated Bullock Report: Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy (1977;
Cmnd. 6706). For a well contextualized account of company law in this period see
T. Hadden, Company Law and Capitalism (2nd ed., 1977), especially Parts I and
Ill.
42 The term refers to a society permeated by new information technologies which are
themselves pivotal sources of productivity and power, see further M. Castells, The
Rise ofthe Network Society (2nd ed., 2000) 21, n.31.
43 Bauman respectively equates the period of solid modernity with heavy capitalism
and liquid modernity with light capitalism, e.g. Liquid Modernity, p.145 and
p.167.
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forced to construct them for themselves." Of course, being inherent to
modernity, individualization was a feature of heavy modernity too, but
crucially the surrogates of class and gender that served as frames for personal
and collective identity orientation during the Fordist period are no longer
straightforwardly available under the regime of liquid modernity." The
reasons for this are complex, but in essence it would seem that the premium
currently placed on flexibility leads to high degrees of uncertainty, low levels
of trust and a focus on short-term engagements. These factors, in turn, reduce
the ability to have a secure and comprehensive, as opposed to provisional
and partial, grasp of the present and thus render any strong teleological view
of societal progression incoherent. Hence, in stark contradistinction to Dicey
merely a century earlier, it is Bauman's view that, '[t]hough the idea of
improvement ... through the legislative action of society as a whole has not
been completely abandoned the emphasis (together with importantly the
burden of responsibility) has shifted decisively towards the self-assertion of
the individual. ,46
Further, the demise of collectivism is compounded by the onerous nature of
the responsibility placed upon each individual and the unequal allocation of
resources to perform the task. As Bauman notes:
"[t]he task of self-identification has sharply disruptive side
effects. It becomes the focus of conflicts and triggers mutually
incompatible drives. Since the task shared by all has to be
performed by each under sharply different conditions, it
divides human situations and prompts cut-throat competition
rather than unifying a human condition inclined to generate co-
operation and solidarity.":"
However, even as the possibilities of collective action for labour seem to be
receding, as it becomes ever more difficult for individuals' interests to
cohere, it is also the case that labour is simultaneously losing out in the
dimension of power. The reason for this is that labour has largely remained
bound to particular local geographical territory whilst capital alone has
broken free of the previously binding relationships that constituted the matrix
of solid modernity and attained unprecedented mobility within the de-
regulated flows of the global marketplace." As power in the context of liquid
modernity lies in the ability to disengage even the threat of withdrawal based
44 The concept is thus quite different to laissez-faire individualism; see also U. Beck
and E. Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization (2002) preface xxi, and 202.
45 For Beck class in second modernity is indeed reduced to a zombie category, ibid.,
p. 206. Less radically, a recent historical study has discerned three basic models of
class (labelled hierarchical, tripartite and dichotomous respectively) which
intersect and operate simultaneously in the contemporary British consciousness
but nevertheless concludes that whilst class continues to have significance this is
not primarily as a mobilizing collective force: see further D. Cannadine, Class in
Britain (2000).
46 Liquid Modernity, p.29.
47 ibid., p.90, and see also p.35. Truly, to use Milan Kundera's' phrase, an
'unbearable lightness of being'.
48 This is certainly true of the global financial markets but is taken by many
commentators to apply equally to transnational corporations, see e.g. G. Soros,
George Soros On Globalization (2002) I.
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upon the real potential to do so creates a powerful bargaining chip for capital
against both workers and state. Capital flight is thus one of the principal
organising features of light capitalism and the resultant accommodation of
the expanded market its accompanying leitmotif."
Further, even the requirements of greater flexibility demanded by the regime
of light capitalism do not appear to have undercut the resilience of the large
corporation by breaking the huge monoliths that populated the Fordist
landscape into more nimble small and medium enterprises as some
commentators had predicted." Hence, the demise of collectivism has
impacted differentially upon the Fordist trinity by re-configuring the bounds
of the market and public space, very crudely: workers are individualized; the
'state loses many of its substantive directive capacities and increasingly
undertakes an enabling role; and companies seem increasingly powerful as
institutional repositories of collective resources" subject principally to a
market discipline in any event closely aligned with the rationalities and
values underlying their own constitution.52
Individualism Re-born: Thatcherism and the Neo-Liberal
Heritage
In order to better understand the way in which companies are conceptualised
within the territory of light capitalism it is also necessary to trace the
development of the intellectual currents opposed to collectivism during the
twentieth century and Dicey once again provides a good point for departure.
At the outset of the twentieth century Dicey was already nostalgic for the
days of Benthamite liberal individualism (which had been in its pomp some
forty years before), even though he was self-consciously writing his analysis
of the growth of the collectivism when that expansion was yet to reach its
zenith - his preface to the second edition of Law and Public Opinion in
England (published in 1914) indicates his awareness that the corporate
entity, trades unions and the state itself were all still expanding both their
size and capacities. Indeed, it was perhaps due to the relatively nascent
development of collectivism and his acknowledgement that some social
reform was necessary that Dicey's outlook as a committed liberal
individualist was manifested only by a general wistful tone and occasional
49 The reality of capital flight is a matter of considerable contention; Bauman adopts
a hyperglobalist stance with little qualification: Liquid Modernity, pp.149-150.
Commentators more sceptical of globalization view companies as less likely to
seek extraterritoriality and nation states as retaining greater capacities: see, e.g. P.
Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalization in Question (2nd ed., 1999) chap. 8.
50 For a brief discussion see Caste lis, op. cit., n.42, pp.167-8.
51 In the field of economic regulation, where substantial organizations (including the
state and state agencies) bargain amongst themselves in 'regulatory space', this
facet has made the large company both a very important and, given that by virtue
of its functions it transcends the conventional public-private divide, also a unique
player. See further, L. Hancher and M. Moran eds., Capitalism, Culture. and
Economic Regulation (1989) chap. 10, and especially 272 and 274-5.
52 This is not to suggest that economic efficiency is necessarily the principal driver
behind the development of the large company: for alternative political and
organizational accounts see respectively, W. G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise
0/the Large Industrial Corporation in America (1997) and C. Perrow, Organizing
America: Wealth Power and the Origins ofCorporate Capitalism (2002).
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warnings as to the consequences ofthe collective principle if worked through
to its logical conclusion.
However, by 1944, when Friedrich Hayek published The Road to Serfdom,
the appeal to individualism had become much more passionate and urgent as
collectivism was much more firmly entrenched and indeed the liberal
influence of writers such as Dicey had waned to an extent that caused Hayek
to lament that such figures once '... admired in the world at large as
outstanding examples of the political wisdom of liberal England, are to the
present generation largely obsolete Victorians. ,53 For Hayek, writing against
a background of the totalitarian regimes of Nationalism Socialism in
Germany and Stalinist Marxist Leninism in the USSR, this generational
change in outlook was most regrettable, as it was the dangers of collectivism
(particularly the threat to individual freedom highlighted by the like of
Dicey) which were now all too apparent.
Although the precise definition of the concept of collectivism was
problematic for Hayek, as was the case for Dicey, it is clearly focused upon
socialism and the centralised control of the economy by the state. 54 In
Hayek's view at a technical level planning on this basis was doomed to
inefficiency on epistemological grounds as the state was incapable of
collating the information required, and at a moral level such co-ordination
was wrong as it was imposed upon individuals regardless of their own values
and desires." Ultimately there was thus a stark moral choice to be made in
selecting a method of economic co-ordination between the paths of freedom
and coercion: liberalism gave priority to the former and collectivism
inevitably resulted in the latter. For Hayek the key policy prescription to
preserve individual liberty was thus to maximise use of the spontaneous
forces of society and to resort as little as possible to coercion. However,
although economic co-ordination was to be provided primarily by the
spontaneous workings of the free market, Hayek repeatedly rejected a
dogmatic laissez-faire stance and indicated that the state does have a role
(albeit relatively minimal) particularly in maintaining an effective legal
system and preserving competition. 56
The political facts then underlying world events meant that Hayek's principal
argument was directed to the relation between the state and individual and,
whilst this axis brought the market to the fore, it did not have great deal to
say about the significance of the corporate entity. Further, the collective
53 F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1997, first published 1944) 136. It is not
possible in this context to examine the rich vein of work Hayek subsequently
produced, notably The Constitution of Liberty (1960) and Law, Legislation and
Liberty (1993). For a most insightful survey and critique of Hayek's oeuvre see 1.
Gray, Hayek on Liberty (3rd ed., 1998).
54 The problem is of quite a different order to that posed by Dicey; see Hayek, The
Road to Serfdom, pp.24-26.
55 The two strands are intimately related given Hayek' s belief that knowledge is tacit
and, therefore, local.
56 E.g. ibid., pp.27-29 and p.60. Whilst here both of these functions are seemingly
conceived in part as self-consciously creative acts by the state, in later writings
Hayek seems to suggest an application of the principle of spontaneous order to the
constitution of the institutional fabric itself: for a brief commentary see Gray, op.
cit., n.53, p.70.
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effort and technological progress evidenced during the war stimulated an
expansive and optimistic view of state action and Hayek's ideas thus fell on
largely stony ground. 57 In addition, Hayek's views in The Road to Serfdom
were perhaps somewhat negatively expressed. 58 It fell to Milton Friedman,
some twenty years later, to place the populist liberal economic argument
concerning competitive capitalism in a more celebratory mode, with the
publication of Capitalism and Freedom in 1962.59 Friedman explicitly
aligned himself to the tradition of Dicey and Hayek and consequently also
sought to restrict the ambit of the state and to maximise the freedom of the
individual through the mechanism of market exchange. In Freidman's view
contracts determined in a free market provided the optimal level of co-
ordination without resort to coercion as it is the case that, ' ... both parties to
an economic transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is bi-
laterally voluntary and informed. ,60 The role of the state was, in similar vein
to Hayek, to establish and enforce the legal framework, to act
paternalistically in the rare case of mental incapacity and to intervene in
cases of monopoly.
The discussion of monopoly power is central to Friedman's exposition of
competitive capitalism and involves an examination of the Fordist triad of
corporation, labour and state. The reason that monopoly is so important
within Friedman's framework is due to the fact that it removes choice with
the consequent dual effects of preventing true free exchange and of rendering
the monopolist's power visible, thereby leading to calls for it to be exercised
in a socially responsible manner. As is well known, Friedman strongly
rejects any suggestion that the agents of business (or labour) have in general
any duty to act responsibly or in any way beyond that served by the pursuit
of the shareholders (for unions read members) self-interest. Fortunately his
survey of the extent of monopoly in the United States proved that there was
little overall cause for concern in the business field and, whilst growing, the
monopolistic effects of labour combination were similarly still fairly
negligible: the major problem lay in government regulation through federal
agencies of sectors such as agriculture and transport." Thus it would seem
that Friedman's fundamental position, as verified by him on a general
empirical level, can be accurately summarised as follows:
"The participant in a competitive market has no appreciable
power to alter the terms of exchange; he is hardly visible as a
separate entity; hence it is hard to argue that he has any 'social
responsibility' except that which is shared by all citizens to
obey the law of the land and to live according to his lights.?"
57 The 1945 general election resulted in the Labour Party achieving a landslide
victory and the Atlee government proceeded to lay the foundations of the modem
welfarestate.
58 The title itself sets the oppositional tenor of the book and also establishes its dark
and sombre tone.
59 M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1982, first published 1962).
60 ibid., p.13 (italics in original).
61 ibid., chap. VIll.
62 ibid., p.120: the parallel with Adam Smith's invisible hand is obvious, but note
also Bauman's comment that, '[t]he favourite strategic principles of the powers-
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Although this is not a point that Friedman needed to elaborate upon, it would
seem from his discussion of enterprises, made in the immediate textual
context of the above quoted proposition, that a company would constitute
such a 'virtually invisible' market participant." Further, this conclusion is
reached despite the express consideration (admittedly made earlier and in a
different context) of the application to the corporation of the conflict arising
between the freedom to combine and the freedom to compete.
Dicey also made reference to this point and it is instructive to note the
different ways in which these two liberal thinkers frame the issue and how
the notion of collective power is much less visible and important in
Friedman's analysis. For Friedman the conflict is essentially one within the
market domain and concerns the possibility of a monopoly arising either
through restriction of the freedom to establish an enterprise or restriction of
access to the market by established participants." Whilst Dicey's discussion
of the characteristics of modem commerce is also concerned with
monopoly," he nevertheless situates the narrow problem at hand squarely
within his conceptual opposition between collectivism and individualism. In
this light the freedom to incorporate with limited liability that was finally
conso lidated in the Companies Act 1862 paradoxically both enhanced
individual freedom and yet also simultaneously undercut it by transferring
the management of business to corporate bodies, and thereby substituting
'combined for individual action'."
The work of Hayek and Friedman thus provided a set of ideas which linked
economic individualism with political freedom and which elevated the
market into the key institutional mechanism for 'organizing' society. By way
of correlation, the state's role, together with that of the political realm
generally, was to be consciously reduced by the adoption of '... a
presumption or prejudice in favour of individual liberty, that is, of laissez
faire. ,67 Within the market equity would be realised by formal rules of
equality of opportunity (with no regard to equality of outcome)" and, in the
absence of monopoly, market actors would be treated alike with no reference
to their relative substantive capacities. As Friedman himself dryly noted,
such ideas were somewhat out of the mainstream given the predominant
that-be are nowadays escape, avoidance and disengagement, and their ideal
condition is invisibility': Liquid Modernity, pAD.
63 This ambiguity is nevertheless unfortunate given the undoubted significance of the
company within the system of competitive capitalism. Contrary to the orthodox
legal understanding Friedman appears to view companies as direct instruments of
their shareholders with no effective separate personality (op. cit., n.59, p.135) and
private companies are on this basis directly equated with individuals in the market
iibid., p.I4). The position of publicly traded companies is hard to glean but
presumably they too must be regarded as normal market participants unless they
have attained a monopoly position.
64 ibid., p.26.
65 Like Friedman who in most cases of technical monopoly would reluctantly opt for
the least worse evil of private ownership tibid., p.28) Dicey would seem reluctant
to endorse state ownership as preferable to joint stock ownership in such
circumstances, see Dicey, op. cit., n.18, pp.245-248.
66 ibid., p.246, n.2.
67 Friedman, op. cit., n.59, p.2DI.
68 ibid., p.195.
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Keynesian mode of thinking at height of Fordist collectivism and thus
received little attention until experience changed the climate of thinking. 69
The events that led to such a change are relatively easy to list (principally the
oil shocks, high inflation, and industrial conflict of the 1970s and the nascent
technological and cultural changes of that decade, which would lead to an
intensification of competition in the global market, together with an
increasing emphasis on consumption as opposed to production) but
notoriously difficult to analyse, particularly as to causality, given the number
of inter-related processes." Further, whilst many companies have employed
lean just-in-time production and sought niche markets, it is clear that
elements of Fordist mass production still remain, even if production is more
automated and companies more downsized and delayered. Nonetheless,
whether the new environment is labelled as a regime of flexible
accumulation," disorganized capitalism," light capitalism or post-Fordism,"
one common feature is an acknowledgement of the decline of the economic
nationalism that was at the core of the Keynesian-Fordist state and by
implication of the unmediated directive capacities of the state itself.
The times were thus propitious for the Thatcherite 'project', which
celebrated the individual and the market, and was explicitly both anti-statist
and anti-collectivist (at least in relation to trades unions) in outlook. Whilst
there is considerable debate as to extent that Thatcherism was conceived
from the outset as coherent political project and to which it completely
reflected the emerging environment as opposed to seizing upon certain
elements of it, there is no doubt that it resulted in the 'establishment of a neo-
liberal economic and political agenda as the dominant paradigm to
characterise British politics. ,74 Thatcherism drew heavily upon both Hayek
and Friedman in order to provide a theoretical underpinning for the retreat of
the corporatist state and the ascension of the market. As is well known, this
required the nurturing of an enterprise culture that extended beyond the
formal economy and required the construction of rugged individuals
motivated by self-interest and capable of exploiting opportunities in a
dynamic economy. The enterprise culture and the market-individualism it
demanded was thus '. . . at the very heart of the Government's moral
crusade. ,75
69 ibid., 1982 Preface.
70 See A. Amin ed., post-Fordism- A Reader (1994). In his introductory chapter
Amin indicates the dispute as to the very existence of the transition and discusses
three of the leading post-Fordist models, viz: the regulation school, the neo-
Schumpeterian school and the flexible specialization school.
71 Harvey, op. cit., n.36, Part 11.
12 S. Lash and J. Urry, The End ofOrganized Capitalism (1987).
73 For accessible overviews see, Brown and Lauder, op. cit., n.36, Part 11, and A.
Stewart, Theories ofPower and Domination (2001) chaps. 3 and 4.
74 For a subtle analysis, see R. Heffeman, New Labour and Thatcherism (2001)
chaps. 3 and 4 (quotation p.60).
75 See P. Heelas and P. Morris eds., The Values of the Enterprise Culture (1992)
(quotation p.l ) for an excellent set of critiques. Chapter 2 of this work also
contains a short discussion of the enterprise culture by one of its chief progenitors,
Lord Young.
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The pursuit of this objective led to some deep paradoxes, for, as discussed
above, the essential dynamism of the capitalist process is such as to place
societal authority, coherence and stability in constant question due to the new
freedoms it undoubtedly generates. Hence, a strong state is required in order
to make appropriate regulatory interventions. By way of illustration, markets
in complex societies require to be structured in such a way as to ensure their
visible probity, so as to maintain confidence in their operation. An excellent
example of this is given by Bruce Carruthers and Terence Halliday in their
study of the regulation of the insolvency market by the Thatcher government.
The mode of governance adopted essentially involved licensing a monopoly
position to a newly created profession of insolvency practitioners. Whilst this
would on general policy grounds have been a complete anathema, it was here
a necessary evil, allowing an indirect extension of the state's power of
surveillance into a private market through the reporting obligations placed
upon the profession. Contrary to neo-liberal theory, in the cold light of
reality markets do not therefore spontaneously emerge but require to be
actively constituted for '[t]he legitimation of markets, and the provision of
normative foundations, is substantially a political problem. ,76
In addition, the intensification and greater permeation of market operations
within society and the expansion of market processes and attitudes that an
enterprise culture entailed generated a deeper paradox, for as Stefan Breuer
has noted, '[m ]arket societalization means an increase in interdependency
and the atomization of the social, the increasing density and the negation of
all ties - asocial sociability. ,77 In this climate the outcome of competitive
market processes was thus more likely to produce an aggressive market
individualism focused around calculative behaviour, unrestrained egoism,
ambition and excessive consumption than the more restrained Victorian
virtues of prudence, thrift and respectability that many Thatcherites
espoused. A further facet of the 'asocial sociability' underlying market
individualism derives from the principal theoretical basis the Thatcherites
adopted, for '[n]eoliberal economics rests upon an image of the autarkic
human self. It assumes that individuals alone can master the whole of their
lives, that they derive and renew their capacity for action within
themselves. ,78 Accordingly, for Thatcherites the avowed belief in the justice
of market outcomes as the result of a non-coercive process thus enabled
considerable moral responsibility to be placed upon the individual for any
setbacks: failure was due to a lack of personal effort or enterprise. Such an
all encompassing view of market relations led to a further paradox, for (being
moral1y neutral as to outcome) the market is itself incapable of generating
76 T. C. Halliday and B.G. Carruthers, 'The Moral Regulation Of Markets:
Professions, Privatization and the English Insolvency Act 1986' (1996) 21
Accounting, Organizations and Society 371, 373. The ramifications of this are far
reaching for as Campbell (who strongly endorses the value of market
arrangements) states, '[t]he private, as a category in itself, does not exist, for the
private is a public construction, the limits of which are then a matter of public
debate': D. Campbell, 'The Hybrid Contract and the Merging of the Public and
Private Law of the Allocation of Economic Goods' in D. Campbell and N.D.
Lewis eds., Promoting Participation: Law or Politics? (1999) 68.
77 S. Breuer, 'The Denouements of Civilisation: Elias and Modernity' (1991) 128
International Social Science Journal 401,407.
78 Beck and Beck-Gemsheim, op. cit., n.44, preface xii.
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the underpinning values and norms upon which its very operation depends.
Further, the social cohesion necessary to undertake this task is particularly
hard to build if individuals are regarded as entirely self-sufficient (which in
any event is obviously empirically problematic) as 'trust is far more likely to
flourish in a society whose members openly acknowledge their
interdependencies and vulnerabilities and build their ethic of fairness around
this realization. ,79
In the light of the above, and the central paradox that the Thatcherites
embraced a radical view of market relations whilst simultaneously seeking to
maintain traditional values and gender roles, it is unsurprising that there was
a resort to 'authoritarian populism:" in order to maintain social stability.
However, whilst the state thus needed to be strong, it was also undoubtedly
re-configured to a more enabling role, and corporatism and trades union
collectivism were effectively swept away in accordance with Hayek's
precepts that,
"... the real exploiters in our present society are not egoistic
capitalists or entrepreneurs, and in fact not separate
individuals, but organizations which derive their power from
the moral support of collective action ... More real injustice is
probably done in the name of group loyalty than from any
selfish motives."!'
The ground was thus cleared for the market, and most importantly the values
embodied in the market individual, to hold sway: for as Lady Thatcher
herself made clear whilst, '[e]conomics are the method: the object is to
change the soul.,82 At the same time the collective power of the corporation
was rendered invisible as the company was seemingly absorbed as just one
other actor into the anonymity of the market process."
'New Times' and New Labour
The demise of collectivism, as exemplified by organised labour and the
Keynesian Fordist state, together with the radical re-vivification of the
individual as a homo economicus in the Thatcherite neo-liberal mould has
placed a great deal of expectation upon the market as an institutional tool and
a corresponding pressure on individuals to adopt an entrepreneurial self, for
as David Jenkins has put it '[a] useful modus operandi has been
overpromoted into being an inevitable modus vivendi.,84 However, New
79 L.E. Mitchell, Stacked Deck: A Story ofSelfishness in America (1998), especially
chap. 10 (quotation p. 208). See also M. A. Fineman, The Autonomy Myth (2004)
urging collective responsibility in the family sphere as an acknowledgement of
universal dependency.
80 For general critiques see: S. Hall and M. Jacques eds., The Politics ofThatcherism
(1983) (quotation p.IO); Giddens, Beyond Left and Right (1994) chap. 1; J. Gray,
Fa/se Dawn (1999) 24-28; and D. Marquand, Decline ofthe Public (2004) chap. 4.
SI Hayek, Law, Legis/ation and Liberty (1993) Vol. 3, 96.
82 The Sunday Times, 7 May 1988.
83 Hayek's later views are most instructive here, for although he identifies
organizational power as both important and undesirable (due to its essentially
coercive nature), he is most reluctant to apply his analysis to the company as
opposed to the trade union, see op. cit., n.81, chap.l5.
S4 D. Jenkins, Market Whys and Human Wherefores (2000) 114.
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Labour has not relieved this pressure on individuals nor refuted the need for
markets, as both are deemed inescapable if Britain is to be competitive in the
dynamic, globalized world economy: in Gordon Brown's words '. . . our
mission must be relentless: to strengthen markets, to maximise efficiency. ,85
Hence, traditional Labour demand management policies have been
discarded" in favour of supply-side interventions (which in Brown's view
actively constitute growth according to neo-classical endogenous growth
theory) in order to support a culture of enterprise and the structural flexibility
required within a modem knowledge economy. The role of the state in the
economy has thus been re-modulated, for, as Alan Finlayson has noted,
whilst' ... dogma driven neo-liberals sought to liberate the market from the
state, New Labour seeks to deploy that state in the name of the market
because it sees that the nature of the market has changed." In this sense New
Labour has both adopted and adapted the inherited Thatcherite terrain."
However, in contrast to Thatcherism, New Labour's vision of the world is
not primarily ideological for,
"... New Labour does not formulate political ideas on the
basis of a substantial moral claim about the nature of society
and the distribution of its resources. It does so on the basis of a
'sociological' claim about the novel condition of contemporary
society; a belief that the world has been transformed, while our
political ideas have not kept up pace. .. [Thus] [p]olicy is
legitimated not by ethical principles but by the truth of certain
social facts ...,,89
Finlayson identifies that two key influences on New Labour in determining
the relevant social facts are the analysis of Thatcherism and post-Ford ism
given at the end of the 1980s in the 'New Times"? and the work of Anthony
Giddens. The New Times analysis by leading Marxists sought to develop
ideas for the left in response to 'epochal change' and roughly comprised two
broad strands of thinking, one organisational and the other ideological, but
85 Speech to the Social Market Foundation (3 February 2003). Whilst this speech
contains a far reaching analysis of the role of markets, including the views of
critics on their moral limitations, the fundamental message is accurately conveyed
by the quotation. For a good summary of the present New Labour stance see the
election speeches of Blair (Canary Wharf, 14 April 2005) and Brown (London
Business School, 27 ApriI20Q5). For a comprehensive account of the New Labour
project see S. Driver and L. Martell, New Labour: Politics after Thatcherism
(1998) and Blair's Britain (2002).
&6 Such policies are perceived as infeasible in any event due to the electoral
implications of taxation. A point presciently noted by Dicey as being likely to
arrest collectivist growth: op. cit., n.18, p.302, n.1.
87 A. Finlayson, 'New Labour: the Culture of Government and the Government of
Culture' in T. Bewes and J. Gilbert eds., Cultural Capitalism: Politics after New
Labour (2000) 177, 186.
8& The post-Thatcherite label should not disguise fundamental differences
particularly over social welfare and cohesion; see Driver and Martell (1998), op.
cit., n.85, chaps.5 and 6.
&9 A. Finlayson, 'Third Way Theory' (1999) 70 (3) The Political Quarterly 271, 271.
90 Hall and Jacques eds., New Times: The Changing Face ofPolitics in the 1990 's
(1989).
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both based on the wider cultural understanding of political economy that
emerged in the Thatcherite period.
The organizational thread" has been the most influential and received an
undoubted boost due to the exponential growth in information technology
that has occurred since the early 1990s combined with an increasing
awareness of the processes of globalization. Indeed, the need for flexibility
and entrepreneurship in order to compete in a relentlessly dynamic global
market driven by the knowledge economy and organized through open-ended
networks has become a New Labour mantra." Whilst market individualism
was thus embraced, albeit for practical as opposed to ideological purposes,
New Labour was not blind to the problems of social cohesion that beset the
Thatcherite years and the difficulties that rampant individualism had caused
for the very sustenance of effective markets. Thus in order to socialise the
market individualist, Blair first focused upon the concept of stakeholding,"
which, as initially conceived, was a radical concept with application in the
spheres of eco~omy, society and politics.
An alternative approach to integrating the individual with society had already
been offered by the ideological strand of the New Times which had analysed
the rise in consumption and freedom associated with markets (in conjunction
with the decline of collective solidarities) as opening up new ground for a
radical politics of identity." Such a politics would seek both to celebrate
difference and diversity and to highlight their significance as hitherto
neglected sites of conflict and power. In this respect there was a clear
resonance with stakeholding, which, at the very least, operated by seeking to
identify certain interests with particular individuals or groups and allowing
for the pluralist representation of these interests. It would seem that this
'constitutionalized' conflictual element was the key conceptual problem with
both ideas for New Labour, as the meta-picture of society that it was seeking
to present was based on a fundamental identity of individual interest"
framed by a globalization discourse of economic inevitability." This
approach is perhaps best illustrated by the New Labour account of social
justice and wealth creation, which reconciles the traditional tension between
91 ibid., see, e.g. the contributions by 1. Urry and C. Leadbeater.
92 The exhilaration of light capitalism and the inevitable burden of individualization
are well brought out in the titles to the principal works of the leading guru: see C.
Leadbeater, Living on Thin Air (1999), and Up the Down Escalator (2002). A
similar analysis has also been undertaken in the V.S.: see R. Reich, The Work 0/
Nations (1993), and The Future ofSuccess (2002).
93 Launched in a series of speeches whilst still in opposition, see Blair, New Britain:
My Vision 0/a Young Country (1996) Part Ill.
94 See Hall, 'The Meaning of New Times' in Hall and Jacques op. cit., n.90, p.116.
95 This has led to a break with many post-Marxists for whom the essence of
democratic politics lies in 'agonistic pluralism': see C. Mouffe, The Democratic
Paradox (2000) chap.5, and Hall, 'The Great Moving Nowhere Show' Marxism
Today (1998) 9.
96 See M. Watson and C. Hay, 'The Discourse of Globalisation and the Logic of No
Alternative: Rendering the Contingent Necessary in the Political Economy of New
Labour' (2003) 31 Policy & Politics 289. For Watson and Hay this was a political
choice but others on the left see the processes of globalization as genuinely
constraining e.g. D. Coates, 'Capitalist Models and Social Democracy: the Case of
New Labour' (2001) 3 Brit. J o/Pol. & Int. ReI. 284.
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the two by opting for a model based on equality of opportunity, thereby
consigning equality of outcome (with its dampening effect on enterprise and
re-distributive focus) to history. This conception of social justice enables the
state to portray much of its activity as a technocratic or managerialist
response to structural changes affecting the whole of society," whilst
simultaneously devolving much of the responsibility for outcomes to
individuals through their actions in the marketplace.
On this basis it is unsurprising that communitarianism has thus proved to be
much more palatable than stakeholding as an organizing principle, for it
allows issues to be addressed to an inclusive non-sectional audience, and' ...
offers Labour modernizers a political vocabulary which eshews market
individualism, but not capitalism, and which imbues collective action but not
class or the state. ,98 As such, the aspects of stakeholding that are too
reminiscent of Old Labour, especially the corporatist and Keynesian
elements in Will Hutton's version," are neatly avoided. However, the
stakeholder concept was formulated very much with the large company in
mind as a means of generating active space for the exercise of voice and the
demonstration of accountability over corporate decisions. 100
Communitarianism by contrast, although also a broad concept which permits
of many shades of meaning, has under New Labour tended to be of a
conservative and prescriptive ilk.101 Further, whilst New Labour has been
keen to stress the responsibilities of individuals (e.g. the principle of
conditionality to welfare rights) within this framework,'?' responsibilities in
the corporate sector have been placed on a much more voluntarist footing
within a context that has come to be dominated by the need for light
regulation and low constraints on business actors. 103 In sum, the
organizational strand of the New Times analysis has led New Labour to a
world view dominated by global capital and in which community is primarily
a resource for individuals to face technological imperatives rather than a
collective public realm to generate countervailing values to those of market
individualism. 104
Giddens and Post-Traditional Society
As the chief architect of the 'Third Way' there can be no doubt of Giddens'
influence upon New Labour. 105 That his politics spring from his
97 See Finlayson, op. cit., n.89, p.274.
98 Driver and Martell, 'New Labour: Culture and Economy' in L. Ray and A. Sayer
eds., Culture and Economy after the Cultural Turn (1999) 255.
99 W. Hutton, The State We're In (1995); The State to Come (1997); and The
Stakeholding Society (1999).
100 ibid. See also G. Kelly, D. Kelly and A. Gamble, eds., Stakeholder Capitalism
(1997).
101 Driver and Martell, op. cit., n.98.
102 See N. Rose, 'Inventiveness in Politics' (1999) 28 Economy & Society 467.
103 See Blair's speech to the IPPR (26 May 2005). For a discussion of how business
interests led to preference accommodation (as opposed to preference shaping) by
New Labour pursuant to the modified structural dependence thesis see Hay, The
Political Economy ofNew Labour (1997) chap.5.
104 See further, Marquand, op. cit.; n.80, chap.5.
105 There are, however, clear differences between Blair and Giddens as the former
takes a rather neo-Iiberal view of both globalization and individualism: see
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understanding of radically new social facts, as Finlayson suggests, would
seem equally incontestable:
"Revisionist social democracy starts from the reality of a
structural transformation in the economy and society. It
responds to intensifying global economic competition; the rise
of a service and knowledge-based economy ... and to the rise
of a pervasive cultural individualism, itself linked to a decline
in deference ...,,106
However, neither stakeholding nor community figure significantly in
Giddens' account, which is determined principally by his investigation into
the nature of the individual in high modemity.l'" The three key elements of
his analysis are globalization, the emergence of a post-traditional order and
the expansion of social reflexivity. The processes of globalization are
important, not primarily in an economic sense, but due to the compression of
time and space that they allow. Globalization thus entails continual
disembedding, by which interaction is lifted out from the particularities of
locales. Individuals are thus required to subject both their understanding and
experience of a disembedded interaction to critical interrogation so as to re-
assemble them reflexively, and thereby gain meaningful purchase on the
social world. However, this very process also re-constitutes the interaction
itself, and for Giddens post-traditional societies are thus irredeemably
reflexive. Equally, such societies also operate at the edge of Enlightenment
rationalism, as the far-reaching interventions so enabled (particularly in the
scientific field) have generated manufactured risk, which, in turn, creates
uncertainties not amenable to expert resolution. 108
The effect on the human self is quite profound. In traditional societies an
individual's space for action and ontological security was largely determined
by received tradition and mediated authority (to a significant extent replaced
by collective modes of assurance based upon Enlightenment rationality (e.g.
bureaucracies) in early modernity). However, disembedding is hostile to
received tradition, and thus in a post-traditional society it is in Giddens' view
necessary for each individual reflexively to create their own biography. 109 It
is primarily in this frame that Giddens rejects both Keynesian economic
management' 10 and neo-conservative communitarian attempts to ground the
self.'!' Instead, the individual in high modernity needs to develop an
autotelic self, which term:
"... refers to a person able to translate potential threats into
rewarding challenges, someone who is able to turn entropy
further, Driver and Martell, 'Left, Right and the Third Way' in Giddens ed.,
(2001), op. cit., n.2, pp.43-5.
106 Giddens and Diamond eds., op. cit., n.2, p.l. This position has been consistent
from the outset: see Giddens (1998), op. cit., n.2, p.26.
107 The following account draws upon Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (1991)
and Beyond Left and Right (1994) (hereafter 'Left and Right').
108 Giddens (1991), ibid., p.3 I.
109 Class is thus no longer experienced simply as 'collective fate': Left and Right,
pp.143-4.
110 It is hard to direct individuals in a reflexive world: ibid., p.42.
1\ I Such communities oppress individual autonomy: ibid., pp.124-6.
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into a consistent flow of experience ... [and who] does not
seek to neutralize risk ... [which] is confronted as the active
challenge which generates self-actualization." 112
Through the combination of this view of the self and the enabling role that is
the primary avenue of action left to the state under a regime of reflexive
modernity, Giddens also regards the broad field of politics as being radically
changed. In early modernity the characteristic political mode was to be
found in emancipatory politics, which sought to free individuals from
tradition and mobilized collective power in order to achieve equal access to
civil, political and social rights. By contrast, the focus in a period of
reflexive modernity is perforce upon life politics, which is both generative
and dialogical, and centres on questions of identity construction and lifestyle
choice.'!' Politics has, in this sense, thus moved beyond the contlictual
collective left/right dichotomy and the structure of power in society has been
accordingly re-configured. 114 In essence, Giddens' social democracy seeks to
enable all members of society to participate in life politics, and this aim is
reflected in a movement away from issues of substantive equality.!" to a
concern with avoiding social exclusion, especially from the employment
market. 116
It is easy to see how a self conceived on such a basis potentially maps onto
the market individualist required by neo-liberal enterprise culture. However,
Giddens is clearly opposed to the reductive atomistic version of
individualism propounded by neo-liberals, which he characterises as solely
concerned with '. . . the self-seeking, profit-maximising behaviour of the
marketplace.' 117 Instead, for Giddens the core of individualism lies in
embedded autonomy:
"[i]n a world of high reflexivity, an individual must achieve a
certain degree of autonomy of action as a condition of being
able to survive and forge a life; but autonomy is not the same
as egotism and moreover implies reciprocity and
interdependence. The issue of reconstructing social soIidarities
should not therefore be seen as one of protecting social
112 ibid., p.192. This notion of the self as both resolutely rational and infinitely
plastic has been subject to critique: for a brief overview see A. Elliott, Concepts
ofthe Self(2001) 36-45.
1I3 Giddens(1991),op. cit., n.l 07, chap.7.
114 See, e.g. Giddens and Diamond eds., op. cit., n.2, pp.106-8. It is precisely the
fact that '[r]elations of power and their constitutiverole in societyare obliterated'
in Giddens' thought, that in many critics eyes prevents Giddens from confronting
the' .. , systemic problems of inequalityand instabilitygenerated by capitalism':
see Mouffe, op. cit., n.95, pp.llO-12; and generally A. Callincos, Against the
Third Way (2001).
115 See Giddens (2000), op. cit., n.2, chap.4. For an argument that the rationale of
life politics is too sharply distinguished from emancipatory issues and is liable to
subversionby economic/market logic, see N. Mouzelis, 'Reflexive Modernization
and the Third Way: the Impassesof Giddens' Social-Democratic Politics' (2001)
The Sociological Review 436.
116 Full employment is central to socialjustice: Giddens and Diamond eds., op. cit.,
n.2, p.l08.
117 Left and Right, p.l3.
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cohesion around the edges of an egoistic marketplace. It
should be understood as one of reconciling autonomy and
interdependence in the various spheres of social life, including
the economic domain."!"
However, there would seem to be a fault line through Giddens' thinking
which rests on his ambivalent view of markets. For although markets bring
freedom, dynamism, and innovation, the problems arising for social cohesion
and solidarities are also clear.'" Ultimately, however, Giddens' position is
determined by the fact that there is no practical alternative.!" It is thus made
patent that the new egalitarianism proposed in his latest work pragmatically
falls short of redistributive social justice, due to the need to accommodate
economic imperatives. 121 But such economic imperialism presents serious
difficulties for the autotelic self and for a politics based upon values, for as
Lawrence Mitchell has put it:
"The critical problem in the age of markets is that we have yet
to develop appropriate norms, rules, and social structures to
accompany it, social structures that are necessary to bring
some stability and order ... to the volatile and chaotic market
environment in which we now live . .. The result is anxiety,
resentment, fear, self-interest, and competition without regard
to others. The result is the ethic of fear. And the ethic of fear
threatens cooperation, compassion and fairness within our
society."!"
Mitchell concludes, rather ominously, that' [i]n the absence of consciously
created social norms and social institutions to counter the destabilizing
effects of the market, society itself is at risk of becoming nothing other than
an economic arena.' 123
Such a danger is enhanced by the presence of the company as a dominant
institution in society, with the sole raison d'etre of being an efficient market
actor. Indeed, Giddens' early analysis of the new socio-political realities led
him to muse that, 'the globalizing of capitalist economic relations would
seem on the face of things to leave large corporations in a dominant position
within the economies of states and in the world economy as a whole'!"
However, having identified the potential of corporate collective power,
Giddens concludes that this prima facie situation would in reality only
present difficulties if the company obtained a monopoly. Whilst this
conclusion has an unfortunate resonance with that of Friedman examined
earlier, it is ventured that Giddens' reasoning is more likely to be based upon
118 ibid.
119 ibid., pp.I 0-11.
120 In this respect, at least, Giddens frequently commends the truth of Francis
Fukuyama's, End of History and the Last Man (1992): see e.g. Hutton and
Giddens eds., op. cit., n.2, p.ll.
121 Giddens and Diamond,op. cit., n.2, pp.108-9.
122 Mitchell, 'The Age of Aquarius or, How (I almost) Learned to Stop Worryingand
Love Free Markets' (2004) 88 Minn. L. Rev. 921,949.
123 ibid., p.953. The problem is one that the Victorians also struggled with: see G. R.
Searle, Morality and the Market in Victorian Britain (1998).
124 Left and Right, p.89.
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his general diffuse view of power and upon his specific understanding of the
development of the flattened hierarchies characteristic of post-Fordist
companies as a response to the need for greater reflexivity. 125
However, as his thinking has evolved, Giddens has become considerably less
sanguine about the realities of corporate power. He has acknowledged that
early progressive theory had been too accepting of business and that 'as a
result of two decades of neoliberal dominance, the business world is
threatening to erode its own mandate to operate.' 126 By way of a solution
Giddens has started to explore the need for a civil economy and for the
development of corporate citizenship and social responsibility. m
Corporate Personality and Corporate Law Reform
It maybe objected that much ink has already been spilt on the thorny topic of
identifying the precise jurisprudential basis of corporate identity without
generating any single agreed substantive model, and that any form of
essentialist argument seeking to ground the nature of corporate personality is
accordingly inappropriate and thus doomed to failure. Such was indeed the
import of John Dewey's classic article in 1923, which amounted to a
summation of the intellectual debate on the corporate form that had raged
across the Atlantic at the beginning of the twentieth century, and in which
Dewey's clear conclusion was that, 'for the purposes of law the conception
of "person" is a legal conception; put roughly, "person" signifies what law
makes it signify' .128 However, Dewey's central argument is not fatal to the
nature of the investigation envisaged here, which, instead, builds upon his
wider observation that any theory of corporate personality is infused with
materials 'logically extraneous' to the exercise of legal definition.
Accordingly, being impressed with conflicts of both a political and an
economic nature, corporate theory is inevitably plural. 129
For current purposes only a brief overview of this rich tapestry is possible,
and it is proposed to concentrate upon three key domains: the nexus of
contracts model; the doctrinal position; and stakeholder models. The nexus
of contracts model of the company forms a significant element of the law and
125 'A post-bureaucratic organization can both hamess social reflexivity and respond
to situations of manufactured uncertainty much more effectively than a command
system': ibid., p.122.
126 Giddens ed., (2003), op. cit., n.2, p.11. On New Labour's need to address its
'overly cosy relationship with business' see P. Mandelson, The Blair Revolution
Revisited (2002) p. xlvi.
127 See Giddens and Diamond op. cit., n.2, pp.112-3; Giddens ed., (2003), op. cit.,
n.2, pp.6-12; and Giddens (2000) op. cit., n.2, pp.142-153. An important
contribution has also been made in developing the concept of an embedded
market whereby the social values of communities are the principal regulators of
economic life: see further, 1. Kay, 'The Embedded Market' in Giddens ed.,
(2003), ibid., pp.35-53; and The Truth about Markets (2003).
128 1. Dewey, 'The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality' (1926) 35
Yale L. J 655. See also H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy
(1983) 2 I-48.
129 See e.g. D. Millon, 'Theories of the Corporation' (1990) Duke LJ201; and M.
Hagar, 'Bodies Politic: the Progressive History of Organizational "Real Entity"
Theory' (1989) 50 Univ. Pitt. L. R. 575.
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economics scholarship that is currently the dominant mode of analysis in
Anglo-American thinking on the subject!" and has clearly been influential in
the recent corporate law reform process. 1J1 In essence, the company is
conceived in contractual terms as a network of explicit and implicit bargains
made between the participants in the enterprise. The analytical emphasis
thereafter is placed upon dealing with the problems of the agency costs
arising. In the model's purest form, the distinctive notion of the company as
a separate legal person is thus rendered theoretically superfluous to the
principal investigation. 132 For present purposes the point of interest lies in
this radical 'deconstruction' of the corporate entity, which arguably
symbolically seeks to remove corporate collective power from the wider
public political agenda, either as part of an explicit anti-regulatory neo-
liberal approach, or more usually, so as to deal with the complex agency
problems at the level of detailed microeconornics.!"
The extent to which the judiciary has been influenced by the nexus of
contracts theory is not easy to ascertain. The lack of explicit reference to it
within judgments is to be expected, as its abstract modelling is not easy to
integrate with the traditional mode of reasoning employed in the common
law. If the most that might therefore be found is an echo, then it is arguable
that such a resonance may be detected in the leading modem case on
corporate personality, Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v
Securities Commission?" The details of the case are not important, save that
it concerned the need to attribute knowledge to a company. In his opinion on
behalf of the Privy Council, Lord Hoffmann sought to move away from
organic metaphors of the company!" and move towards a set of primary and
general rules of attribution drawn from the company's constitution and the
general law respectively. In so doing Lord Hoffmann expressed the
following view of corporate personality:
130 See e.g. F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law (1991); and B.R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation
(1997). For critiques see e.g. Ireland, 'Property and Contract in Contemporary
Corporate Theory' (2003) 23 L.S. 453; and W.W. Bratton, 'The Economic
Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation' (1992) 87 Northwestern U. I. R.
180.
131 See especially, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interests and
Formulating a Statement of Duties (1999: Law. Corn. No. 261; Scot. Law. Corn.
No. 173) Part 11.
132 See the points noted in Cheffins, op. cit., n.130, p.32.
133 For recent valuable contributions to this analysis see: ibid., and R. Kraakman et
al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law (2004). It is notable that in order to
contextualize their agency analysis Hansmann and Kraakman have to explain
corporate legal personality and limited liability by way of a property-based
argument (by what they term affirmative and defensive asset partitioning
respectively) and, as Ireland notes, that this move breaks open any model based
on the essential 'private, contractual nature of corporations' to allow a more
radical governance regime based on their social power: see Ireland, op. cit.,
n.130, p.509.
134 [1995] 2 x.c.500 (P.C.).
135 See e.g. the judgment of Denning LJ in H.I. Bolton Engineering Ltd v TJ.
Graham&SonsLtd[1957] I Q.B.159, 172 (C.A.).
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"... reference to a company 'as such' might suggest that there
is something out there called the company of which one can
meaningfully say that it can or cannot do something. There is
in fact no such thing as the company as such . . . only the
applicable rules [of attribution]."136
On the particular facts of the case the relevant knowledge was attributed to
the company by way of a special rule of attribution determined by a
purposive construction of the relevant legislation. There are two paradoxes
here: first, the notion of attribution requires an attributee; and secondly, in
denying the existence of the company 'as such' Lord Hoffmann was actually
extending the scope of corporate liability.!"
By way of contrast, stakeholding models of the company are generally
premised upon a strong notion of the corporation as the seat of significant
power over the various constituencies with an interest in its operations. 138
The theoretical focus is thus to ensure that the corporate form is analysed
within the full social, economic and political context in which it functions, so
as to ensure that appropriate governance mechanisms are in place. The
primary responses to this enquiry have been to seek to place directors under a
fiduciary duty to each stakeholder, to encourage formal employee
participation in corporate decision-making, and to foster corporate social
responsibility. 139 Stakeholding thus has distinctly corporatist overtones and,
as such, has proved politically unattractive to New Labour. 140 In addition,
these overtones are amplified by the ongoing debate between the
individualist and corporatist modes of capitalism!" within the European
Union.!" and the more general contemporary focus on corporate governance
regimes as a site of national comparative economic advantage.!" As might
136 [1995] 2 AC. 506H-507A
137 For commentaries on the decision see: N. Lacey, 'Philosophical Foundations of
the Common Law: Social not Metaphysical' in J. Horder ed., Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence (2000) 17; and G. R. Sullivan, 'The Attribution of Culpability to
Limited Companies' [1996] C.L.J. 515.
138 See e.g. Parkinson, op. cit., n.31; and MitchelJ ed., Progressive Corporate Law
(1995). For a critique, from a person sympathetic to both Third Way politics and
a thoroughly contextualized view of the corporation as a social actor, see S.
Wheeler, Corporations and the Third Way (2002) 29-33.
139 See the influential pieces by M. Stokes, 'Company Law and Legal Theory' in W.
Twinning ed., Legal Theory and Common Law (1986) 155; and Lord
Wedderburn, 'The Social Responsibility of Companies' (1985) 15 Melbourne U.
L. R. 4.
140 Despite early dalliances as noted above in the main text: see also J. Plender, A
Stake in the Future (1997); and Driver and Martell (1998), op. cit., n.85, pp.51-
60.
141 For an early account see M. Albert, Capitalism Against Capitalism (1993).
142 It is a clear undercurrent in the rejuvenated Lisbon Agenda, where the social
model seems to become less prominent in each of the following documents:
Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment Report
from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok (November 2004);
Communication of the Commission to the European Council COM(2005) 24 (2
February 2005); and Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions 7619/05
(23 March 2005).
143 For a comprehensive overview of the debate see: K. 1. Hopt et al., eds.,
Comparative Corporate Governance (1998); J. A McCahery et al., eds.,
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be imagined from the previous discussion the individualist model is favoured
by the United Kingdom, as it is seen as more flexible and dynamic in a world
of change. 144 The European social model, by contrast, although encouraging
long-term investments, is perceived as too cumbersome, and as overly
insulating various interlocking elites from wider accountability and market
pressures. 145
All things considered it is thus hardly surprising that the government has not
proceeded with stakeholder models in its proposals for company law reform.
In fairness, the government is largely following the recommendations of the
Independent Company Law Review that it instigated in 1998 with the object
of ensuring that the United Kingdom had an appropriate regulatory
framework to maintain a competitive corporate regime in the globalized
economy of the new millennium. 146 The Review did in fact consider the
basis of company law by reviewing the content of the company directors'
duties; and generated two models: the enlightened shareholder model (which
was generally agreed to represent the existing law that companies should be
run with a priority to shareholders interests) and the pluralist model.!" The
latter was in effect stakeholding under a different guise and was based not
only on the benefits of fostering co-operative long-term relationships but also
on economic analysis. The underlying economic reasoning was that
shareholders were not the only residual risk bearers in the company as other
stakeholders also made firm specific investments and were unable to protect
themselves by writing complete contracts. In order to maximise the
company's overall wealth creation it was thus necessary to optimise each
stakeholders' firm specific investment by allocating governance rights
beyond simply the shareholders.l"
Whilst the pluralist model was rejected (principally due to the accountability
and enforcement problems arising from a multi-fiduciary duty) its
proponents could claim that it left its imprint upon the inclusive shareholder
Corporate Governance Regimes (2002); and 1. N. Gordon and M. 1. Roe eds.,
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (2004).
144 Blair's speech to the European Parliament (23 June 2005) on the revitalized
Lisbon Agenda attempts to mitigate the individualism but is clear that the social
model requires modernization.
145 See Giddens (2000), op. cit., n.2, pp.151-3. Giddens' disagreement with Hutton
on these issues is best brought out in their conversation reported in Hutton and
Giddens eds., op. cit., n.2, pp. 1-5 I. Whilst some political scientists believe that
the social model continues to offer comparative institutional advantage others are
more sceptical about its continuing ability to generate outcomes for labour that
are superior to individualist models, see respectively: P.A. Hall and D. Soskice
eds., Varieties of Capitalism (2001) 1-68; and Coates, Models of Capitalism
(2000) 259-60.
146 The White Papers are set out in n.l. For a detailed commentary on the review
process by its director, see 1. Rickford, 'A History of the Company Law Review'
in 1. de Lacy ed., The Reform ofUnited Kingdom Company Law (2002) 3.
147 For details see ibid., and G. Wilson, 'Business, State, and Community:
'Responsible Risk Takers', New Labour and the Governance of Corporate
Business' (2000) 27 J ofLaw & Soc 151.
148 See G. Kelly and J. Parkinson 'The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: a
Pluralist Approach' in Parkinson et al., eds., The Political Economy of the
Company (2000) 113.
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duty that was the outcome of the Review, and that has been adopted, in
slightly modified form, by the government. 149 Pursuant to the proposed new
statutory duty company directors must act in the manner they 'consider, in
good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for
the benefit of its members as a whole' .150 In determining this they must, so
far as reasonably practicable, take account of likely short and long term
effects of the decision on the community and environment together with the
interests of employees, customers, suppliers and the company's own need to
maintain a reputation for high standards of business conduct. As the primary
duty is to enhance shareholder benefit and remains owed to the company,
this is clearly not a stakeholder approach. However, although there may be
some devil in the detail, it does, symbolically at least, open the company up
to the outside environment and thus clearly renders it a visible legal actor
(both to external and internal participants) therein. When combined with the
regular disclosure of information by quoted companies under the new
Operating and Financial Review, there is thus some cause for hope that
corporate power will be exercised in a context more open to wider cultural
values, and that reputational concerns in the market might be harnessed to
ratchet-up corporate behaviour. 15I
However, for Sally Wheeler, the fact that the Review frames corporate
relations 'in a context of increasing competitiveness displays a worrying
emphasis on the importance of the market as an institution divorced from
wider concerns such as inclusion and shared advancement.' 152 An ethical
framework that fosters the latter values is vital if the company is to re-
legitimate itself within society; and is central to Third Way philosophy,
which seeks to re-unite the individual and the collective by way of voluntary
action. 153 Wheeler, therefore, advocates that corporations should be treated
seriously as individual actors and encouraged to participate in the polis, so as
to realise themselves as virtuous citizens. Such corporate intervention
(running in tandem with profit-making activities) would be actioned via
partnership with Regional Development Agencies, assessed by way of need
audits, and implemented through care plans.!" The consequence would be
149 Space does not permit a detailed examination of the primary sources, see further:
Rickford, op. cit., n.146, pp.15, 22 and 36-7; and Parkinson, 'The Inclusive
Company' in de Lacy ed., op. cit., n.146, p.43, especially pp.44-52. The
proposed statement of directors' duties is set out in the Corporate Law Reform
Bill, clauses B1-8 (note that the detailed wording is significantly different to the
previous draft Companies Bill in Modernising Company Law (July 2002; Cm
5553-I1».
150 Corporate Law Reform Bill, clause B 3(1).
151 See the excellent discussion in Parkinson, 'Disclosure and Corporate Social and
Environmental Performance: Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social
Frame' (2003) 3 1. Corp. Law Studies 3.
152 Wheeler, op. cit., n.138, p.51.
153 Wheeler founds corporate ethical behaviour in Aristotelian virtue ethics and
utilizes the work of Alasdair Maclntyre to generate a liberal localized conception
of community.
154 It is interesting to speculate whether situating the corporate form in this
conceptual framework would ameliorate the massive disparity in general health
that has been shown to beset societies in which there are large inequalities: see R.
Wilkinson, 'Social Corrosion, Inequity and Health' in Giddens and Diamond
eds., op. cit. n. 2, 183, and The Impact ofInequality: How to Make Sick Societies
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that corporations would both practically apply the kind of values that New
Labour seeks to espouse as a basis for progressive politics and see
'themselves as contributing to the accumulated good of all other individuals
and not as in some way hosted by a wider society and yet separate from it.' 155
Conclusion
It has been noted both, that the Labour Party has demonstrated surprisingly
little interest in the underlying principles of company law during its
history.!" and that '[c]ompany law has been seen 'as an apolitical, technical
subject concerned solely with the rules of private law'!" However, for a
progressive social democratic politics to prevail, and for the values and
rationality of the market individualist not to successfully colonise other
spheres of society, it is vital to recognise the power of corporate agency and
for the company to be brought within dialogical engagement with other
societal groups.!" To this end the proposed company law reforms offer a
chink of light in that company directors will be under a duty to at least
identify the factors relevant to a corporate decision and the increased
disclosure provisions will enhance the visibility of corporate activity.
Nevertheless, whilst of some symbolic value, a significant limitation of the
reforms may be said to lie in the fact that the enforcement of duties remains
principally with the company itself. Taken as a whole the effect the reform
package is thus that the corporation remains subject to discipline contoured
principally by market rationalities.!" Given New Labour's tendency to adopt
market solutions this outcome is doubtless not too surprising, but it is
unfortunate that Giddens has not developed his notion of a civil economy
with more urgency in the light of his increasing disquiet with aspects of
corporate capitalism. It may be that Wheeler's radical vision of the corporate
entity provides the type of utopian thinking required, for otherwise the
combination of largely unacknowledged corporate collective power and
market individualism might yet result in a society such as that depicted by
Kurkov's novels on the anarchic capitalism of post-Soviet Ukraine: 'It was
all money, money, money today. Ideology was OUt.'160
Healthier (2005). For a telling analysis of the inequalities arising from the
shareholder-orientated model of the corporation, see Ireland, 'Shareholder
Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth' (2005) 68 M.L.R. 49.
155 Wheeler, op. cit., n.138, p.80.
156 See B. Clift, A. Gamble and M. Harris, 'The Labour Party and the Company' in
Parkinson et al., eds., op. cit., n.148, p.51.
157 C. Graham, 'Regulating the Company' in Hancher & Moran eds., op. cit., n.51,
p.199.
158 Such dialogue has a double-edged quality, as it may also extend corporate
influence: see Parkinson, 'Participation and Corporate Governance' in Campbell
and Lewis eds., op. cit., n.76, p.319. especially pp.344-7.
159 The inadequacy of which is well demonstrated by Ireland, 'Recontractualising the
Corporation: Implicit Contract as Ideology' in D. Campbell et al., eds., Implicit
Dimensions of Contract (2003) 255, especially 287-8. See also the recent
polemical dissection of corporate power in the United States by Galbraith in The
Economics ofInnocent Fraud (2004).
160 Kurkov, The Case of the General's Thumb (2004) 137, translated by G. Bird. A
view that Mitchell seems close to sharing about the present state of corporate
America: see Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility (2001) 93-4, 258-9.
